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MPRPBY: THE INVISIBLE PRINCE
One of the most haunting and horrifyingly realistic figures
in the history of literature has been Niccolo Machiavelli .

His

name has stood for all that is dark, deep and treacherous in
statesmanship , yet his philosophy has survived to this day .
While his work The Prince purports to be a how-to book for the
Renaissance ruler to maintain power, his philosophy has gained a
disturbing acceptance in contemporary society.

As Justice Murphy

points out, ethics of society have fallen victim to this dark yet
pragmatic view of how to achieve success.
Machiavelli's philosophy of the ends justifying the means
has been employed by members from almost every sector of society .
The Iran-Contra scandal illustrates how a few members of the
government try to justify their abuse of power by claiming their
actions are taken in the name of freedom.

The recent insider

trading scandals of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken remind us that
the corporate sector is infested with those who practice
predatory business agendas, both legal and illegal .
The specter of Machiavelli can also be seen in the current
I

state of the legal profession .

An inherent quality of the field

of law is that an attorney must represent a client zealously,
whether the client is Charles Manson or Jimmy Stewart .

If he

were alive today, Machiavelli would have had no difficulty with
representing an unfavorable client.

In 1512, Machiavelli was

plucked from his political office and imprisoned by the Medici.
Despite years of torture, he sought employment at the palace of
his tormentor, Lorenzo de Medici.

Machiavelli offered his work,

The Prince, to convince Lorenzo that his political talents were
required to maintain order.
Many lay persons view the lawyer as just such, a gun for
hire.

The public sees the lawyer not as an officer of the court

seeking the truth, but rather as a contractor attaining the goal
sought by his client.

The public sees an attorney embracing a

client, an alleged underworld figure, after a verdict of not
guilty is announced.

The public sees a defense attorney trying

to get his client exonerated by procedural defect even if the
substantive proof clearly calls for a conviction.

These images

do not make the legal profession seem ethical to the rest of
society.

In the public's eye, maybe Shakespeare was right on

target when he penned the phrase "let's kill all the lawyers."
In our day, corruption in politics is commonplace and
occasionally expected.

Ethics in government and the legal

profession continue to be an overriding concern in bar
associations across the country.

One thing is definite,

Machiavelli was obviously a man ahead of his time and would have
made both an effective lawyer or politician today.

Whether the

legal profession should strive for Machiavellian qualities is a
disturbing question which Justice Murphy explores in the
following lecture.

"THE INVISIBLE PRINCE"
Hon. Francis T. Murphy
17th Annual John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture
November 2, 1988
Fordham University School of Law
On a December night in 1513, a poor, thin, middle-aged man of
medium height, having a bony face, piercing eyes, and thin lips lining
a secretive smile, entered a little house in Sant'Andrea, seven miles
from Florence. For fourteen years he had been a dedicated
statesman of Florence which he had so lbved that, fourteen years
later, two months before his death, he wrote to his friend, Francesco
Vettori, "I love my native city more than my own soul." In August,
1512, Florence had been sacked by the Medici, and, in November,
he was dismissed from office. In February, 15i3, fWo assassins,
intent upon slaying Giuliano de'Medici, were arrested. Four days
later, they were executed. In the possession of one of them, a list
of about twenty names was found, among them that of our poor
friend. He was seized and tied to a rack. Normally, four turns were
the maximum torture inflicted by the rack, but our friend endured
six turns, yet he would not confess. In March, 1513, after having
been kept handcuffed and shackled in prison, the walls of which
were "full of lice so big and fat they seem like butterflies," he was
released. Exiled from Florence, he returned to his five children, to
whom he had been a good father, and to his wife, to whom he was
constantly affectionate, and constantly unfaithful. After he entered
that little house that December night, he sat at his table and, in a
remarkable letter to his friend, Vettori, he described his
impoverished, desolate life. In autumn, he wrote, he had been rising
before dawn and going out with bird cages on his back in order to
snare thrushes. Now, in winter, he rose with the sun and engaged
in the selling of wood and in the petty arguments that accompanied

it. At lunch, his family and he ate meager food. At the local inn,
he spoke to travelers, and played cards all day with the innkeeper,
the butcher, a miller, and two bakers. With these there were many
loud and offensive arguments over a few pennies. In words that,
like a door flying open, suddenly reveal his soul, he told Vettori:
"Caught this way among these lice I wipe the mold from my brain
and release my feeling of being ill-treated by Fate: I am happy to
be driven along this road by her, as I wait to see if she will be
ashamed of doing so." In one of the famous passages of Italian
literature, our friend told Vettori what he does at night:
"When evening comes, I return to my home, and I go
into my study; and on the threshold, I take off my everyday
clothes, which are covered with mud and mire, and I put on
regal and curial robes; and dressed in a more appropriate manner
I enter into the ancient courts of ancient men and I am
welcomed by them kindly, and there I taste the food that alone
is mine, and for which I was born; and there I am not ashamed
to speak to them, to ask them the reas9ns for their actions; and
they, in their humanity, answer me; and for four hours I feel no
boredom, I dismiss every affiiction, I no longer fear poverty nor
do I tremble at the thought of death: I become completely part
of them .... I have noted down what I have learned from their
conversations, and I composed a little work . . . where I delve
as deeply as I can into thoughts of this subject, discussing what
a principality is, what kinds there are, how they are acquired,
how they are maintained, why they are lost.
Thus, in that little house was The Prince Written· by' Niccolo
Machiavelli, in spirit talking as a peer to the great ancients, to
Aristotle, Caesar, Cicero, and Alexander. 1
The Prince, one of the most powerful political works ever
written, was given by Machiavelli to Lorenzo de'Medici, the ruler of
Florence, in the vain hope that Machiavelli would thus prove himself
of value to the Medici and would be able to support his family by
having a position in that world of politics that he loved with
unbridled passion. Indeed, Machiavelli wrote to Vettori, "I am
wearing myself away, and I cannot remain in this state for long

without being despised for my poverty, opt to mention my desire
that these Medici lords begin to make use of me, even if they start
me off by rolling stones."2
Machiavelli's writing of The Prince was indeed a curiously ugly
gift, for by it he betrayed himself. As a servant of the Florentine
republic, he had proved his absolute de'dication to the ideal of
freedom in a republic. Now, for the sake of a political job, for the
sake of entering the political game that was his inner life, he wrote The Prince, a handbook for autocrats, a bedside book for those who
would use the state to dominate the people. Lorenzo· de'Medici, ·it
is said, accepted Machiavelli's gift of The Prince with less enthusiasm
than two hunting dogs that were given to him at the same time.3
The story is told in proof of Lorenzo's intellectual insensibility. I
read the story differently. Lorenzo, I suspect, knew that two hunting
dogs would give him more loyalty than a politician whose principles
were for sale.4
This slim book is one of the classics of our civilization. Like the

Bible, few have read it and everyone claims to know its contents. 5
What did Machiavelli write in The Prince that so captured the
imagination that, for more than four hundred and fifty years, many
have read his words, celebrated their realism inwardly, yet drawn
back from publicly identifying with him? 6 What in Machiavellianism
made the noted twentieth-century German historian, Meinecke, say
that it "was a sword thrust in the body politic of Western humanity,
causing it to cry out and to struggle against itselr'? 7 Why did the
philosopher, Maritain, say of it that it was "the most violent
mutilation suffered by the human practical intellect". 8 Yet what is
it, in the face of these judgments, that makes it the rare reader who
puts down The Prince without an inexplicable disquiet, perhaps the
pain of a suppressed benevolence towards Machiavelli for appealing
to that pagan desire for an amoral realism that lies deep within each
of us?
What did Machiavelli write in The Prince?
Man, said Machiavelli, desires the creation of a powerful State.
However, in order to create such a state man cannot have delusions

about mankind, else the truth will punish him. He must therefore
closely observe reality and history, particularly the minds of antiquity,
for man never changes. He is everywhere and always the same.
Therefore, man must guard against those who do not look at men
as they are, but who look at them as they ought to be. Statesmen
of that idealistic kind do not deal with things as they are; they drag
men to ruin. They commit the mortal sin of unrealism. Men are
not as Jews and Christians idealize them. In the main, men are,
said Machiavelli, "ungrateful, wanton, false and dissimulating,
~owardl~ and greedy . . . arrogant and mean, their natural impulse
is to be msolent when their affairs are prospering and abjectly servile
when adversity hits them." 9
There is no universal scheme no a
. .
'
pnon .method, by w.hich one can learn about man. Men say they
love liberty, when, m fact, they care little for it. The idea means
more to them than its reality. Liberty means less to them than
s~curity a?d proper~. Man responds to love, but in dealing with
him fear IS more reliable, though the ruler should be cautious that
fear does not turn into hate. As for the morals of the men in
Machiavelli's ideal state, these are to be found in the classical
societies that dominated Machiavelli's imagination. States, he says,
are made great by pagan virtues -- power, pride, public spirit,
austerity, the pursuit of glory, and the expansion of the patria.
And now we come to Machiavelli's notoriously dark side. He is
so candid that one can almost become fonq of him. Machiavelli tells
us that, in order to rule, one may have to be ruthless. Force and
fraud, cruelty, treachery, and even the slaying of the innocent, may
be used. If men must be governed by measures that violate
Judea-Christian morals, then so be it. And th~ is t}le heart of
Machiavellianism. Machiavelli did not liberate politics· from morais,
or ethics, or religion. Machiavelli said that man must choose
between a pagan and a Judea-Christian life. If he chooses the
Judea-Christian life, then man chooses virtues that are insuperable
obstacles to the creation of that Roman society that men want.
~achiavelli does not deny that what Jews and Christians call good
IS actually good, and what is evil, is indeed evil. He does not say
that. cruelty, fraud, and the slaying of the innocent are good
attnbutes. He argued simply that it is impossible to practice
Judea-Christian virtues and enjoy a strong society.
Practice

Judea-Christian virtues and you will be politically impotent, for the
powerful, the clever, and the unscrupulous are waiting in the woods
to overwhelm you. If you want Athens or Rome, take your eyes
away from Jerusalem.
This unresolved choice between two
incompatible moral worlds is the secret wound that man suffers until
today, and suffered before Machiavelli wrote The Prince.
Expressing varying levels of horror, Machiavelli's commentators
have given The Prince meanings so different that one wonders
whether they have read the same text. Some say that The Prince is
a satire. 10 Others say it is a disguised warbing or cautionary tract.11
One thinks The Prince a literary performance common in the
Renaissance, a "mirror for princes. "12 Others say that it is an
anti-Christian piece, a defense of the pagan life.\ 3 Others see in
him a kind of Hamlet, a humanist grieved by human vices that make
evil decisions politically unavoidable, thus he separated politics from
ethics. 14 Some look at Machiavelli as a technician of power,
ethically and politically neutral. 15 Many identify Machiavelli as the
supreme realist. 16 Among the multitude standing in the
bibliographical forest, there are those who say that Machiavelli saw
the State as a work of art, and so treated politics as an esthetic
exercise. 17 An original interpreter saw Machiavelli as a religious and
national reformer who might have been for the Italians, if they had
been like the Germans,~ what Luther, Machiavelli's contemporary,
had been for ~erma.n~.
Whatever these views, the one commonly
held of Machiavelli IS that of most Elizabethan dramatists and
scholars: For them, Machiavelli was called by the devil to lead men
straight to hell. 19
While opinions of Machiavelli and his origination of The Prince
vary radically, the text of The Prince is fixed for those who want to
jud~e its ethical nature. For them, Machiavellianism is an unarmed,
stationary target.
Of course, Machiavelli was a radical pessimist who did not see
in man the image of God, and thus anointed the forehead of
totalitarianism. Of course, politics is a part of ethics. Everyone can
see that Machiavelli reversed that relationship by shaping ethics for

the sake of politics. Indeed, he taught that religion should be used
for the State because of religion's "power as a myth in unifying the
masses and cementing their morale." 20 Certainly, the true end of
politics is the common good, an ethical ehd, while for Machiavelli
the purpose of politics was conquest by power. And surely everyone
knows the answers of personal ethics to political ethics, that man
may never commit evil for any good of any kind, and that the
common good is provided by justice and political'morality. 21 Yet,
while these arguments are intellectually persuasive, they do not
explain why man is so drawn to Machiavelli, almost like a sightseer
drawn to an abyss. It is this human fact that draws me to
Machiavelli as the subject of this address, for it has led me to detect
in Machiavelli the invisible Prince in our society, a society that
Machiavelli could never have foreseen.
There is something in Machiavelli's brutally frank choice of evil
over good that simultaneously facinates and repels man. If ~
~ was a mirror for princes, Machiavelli is in some way a mirror
for man. The choice between good and evil, like a persistent beggar
standing at the door of man's soul, demands an answer to the
tormenting question of whether God exists. In writing The Prince,
however, Machiavelli did not assume that God exists. Indeed, be
showed no interest in conscience or in any theological issue, for The
~ is not an abstract or philosophical treatise. It is an empirical
analysis of politics written independently of any philosophical
construct. Machiavelli, neither a jurist nor a philosopher, was free
of the intellectual convictions of bis age. He does not even refer to
natural law, the language of which was used in his time by Christians
and pagans, jurists, philosophers and theologians. In The Prince,
there is no sign of Platonic or Aristotelian teleology, no allusion to
any ideal order, no shadow of any belief in man's place in nature.
Machiavelli lays all of his cards on the table face-up. He warns us
that he has taken a path never before trodden by any man.
Man, however, knows that the moral nature of his life, and that
of the world, turns upon the answer to the abstract but very real
question of God's existence. And man knows the answer that
ordinary man has given.

Man does not know whether God exists. Man, if he has given
the matter any consideration, believes that God exists and hopes that
good will be rewarded and evil punished in an afterlife. If this is so,
if man's soul is like a frozen sea out of which he can escape only by
faith, then the man of faith, just as Machiavelli has said, has much
to fear, for he knows also that among the mass of mankind faith is
for many, if not for most, a dry reed waiting for the first soft wind
to break it. Hence, man's anxiety over Machiavellianism is rooted,
on one hand, in a sense of genuine peril should he live totally in
faith, and, on the other hand, in a revulsion for the evil of which he is capable should he, in his painful, existential condition, deny
God. Nor is man's sense of a Machiavellian danger limited to
Machiavellianism in politics. Logically, Machiavellianism engages not
only political life but the whole of human life. 22 Thus the reader
of The Prince profoundly senses that only his faith in God separates
him from Machiavelli, and that that faith, under pressure, may give
way, as it does whenever be violates any of bis moral beliefs. Man,
after all, knows nothing if be does not know bis own inconstant
heart. Further, if the reader of The Prince reflects at all upon what
Machiavelli has said, be will suddenly realize that The Prince, written
for the eyes of a prince over four hundred and fifty years ago, might
as well have been addressed to the reader's ears for his guidance as
an ordinary citizen in a modern democracy.
What one man may do, millions may do as one man. Hence,
Macbiavellianism may be expressed in the majoritarian rule of a
democracy as well as in the person of an autocrat. 23 It may be
expressed by people acting independently of their governmental
structures. It may be found in priva(e social institutions, in
economic classes, behind the eyeglasses of a profession, and under
the birettas of pious cardinals. Wherever power is consecrated to
the preservation of an entity or of a class, there in the evening
twilight sits the invisible Prince. Indeed, his residence bas a
chameleon character, for he always seemsi to be in someone else's
country, never one's own. Yet, however invisible he may be, he
leaves an imprint, a mark, a scar. Our nation yields examples, past
and current, from which we naturally avert our eyes.
Prior to our Civil War, the legislatures of slave states showed

their love of a much professed Christianity by enacting statutes of a
kind designed to sustain slavery, and hence the economy of the slave
states, by stripping the black man of his humanity. Section 59 of
chapter 92 of the laws of Mississippi of 1840, for example, provided:
"Sec. 59. If any negro or mulatto shall be found . .
to have given false testimony, every such offender shall,
without further trial, be ordered by the . . . court, to have
one ear nailed to the pillory, and there to stand for the
space of one hour, and then the said ear to be cut off, and
hereafter the other ear to be nailed in like manner, and cut
off at the expiration of one other hour, and moreover to
receive thirty-nine lashes on his or her bare back, well laid
on, at the public whipping post ..."
Alabama's laws of 1843 thoughtfully drove the knife of slavery
into that part of a black man that would never leave him in doubt
about his condition:
"Sec. 16. All slaves are hereby prohibited from
keeping dogs, under any pretence or consideration
whatsoever; and the slave or slaves so offending, upon
complaint thereof before any justice of the peace, shall be
punished with not exceeding twenty-five stripes for every
such offense .... "
A Christian society that would not allow a man a dog would be
careful about allowing him to learn of the Gospel. Accordingly, the
people of Alabama provided:

"Sec. 35. If any slave...shall preach to ... any ... slaves
... unless in the presence of five respectable slave-holders,
any such slave ...shall, on conviction before any justice of the
peace, receive ... thirty-nine lashes for the first offence, and
fifty lashes for every offence thereafter.... "
These slave statutes are not anecdotal material. They are
laboratory specimens of Machiavellianism. Other historical slides
may be placed under the microscope.

Our trade union movement arose O'gt of the clash between
property's self-interest and labor's demand for social justice.
However, when our labor unions reached a point of equilibrium
with their capitalistic managerial opponents, many unions used their
members for purposes that had little to do with social justice, and
much to do with the enlargement of raw union power. These union
members expressed a majoritarian will for 1power that blinded them
to the ethical character of the means they used and the ends they
sought.
Law firms paying large salaries set the standard fdr' the success
of law schools. Law firms and their clients need skilled legal
artisans. They do not need lawyers who will question both the
morality of their professional services and the morality of their
clients' businesses. Accordingly, it is not by chance that law schools
do not require the study of moral philosophy, and particularly the
problems of distributive justice. It is not by chance that law school
catalogues read like handbooks for uncritical minds intent solely
upon earning fees. The law school has thus developed as an
institution less intellectually inquisitive than the university of which
it is a part. In fitting itself within our economic system, the
substantial material rewards of which are found neither in the middle
nor the lower economic classes, it pays the price of accommodation.
It has produced students whose pockets are stuffed with laws and
whose minds are as distant from issues of morality as they are from
problems in biochemistry.
In the main, our established religions have carefully protected
their institutional popularity by accommodating themselves to things
as they are, not as they ought to be. Neither the labor movement,
nor the struggle of women for equality, nor the confrontation of
anti-Semitism or racism, nor the peace movement of the Vietnam
period24 or the peace movement of today, can trace their leadership
to the steps of institutionalized religion. Notwithstanding the
unconditional, ethical commitments of our religious faiths, their
histories in this country have generally shown a contentment with
silence when speech required courage.

Surely, the invisible Prince would have approved the silence of
those churchmen in this country who for generations have known of
the appalling poverty of Latin America where a feudal system,
without feudalism's historical justification, enabled landowners to
dominate the wretched and agonized poor upon whose backs the
landowners lived.
Surely, the invisible Prince would have approved the uncritical
silence of our religious institutions followip.g the nuclear bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to say nothing of the obliteration
bombing of Dresden and other German cities, acts that violated the
principle of discrimination in the conduct of warfare.
Of course, there have been activist clergymen who have engaged
themselves as their consciences directed, bbt our characterization of
them as activists distinguishes them from their churches.
As to activism, one must indeed keep a sharp eye out for the
invisible Prince. Consider, for example, why our coliege ·students
demonstrate against apartheid in South Africa, but never, never
against poverty in the United States. There are about 33 million
Americans who are poor, and another 20 to 30 million who have so
little that, by any measure, they are in need. Why are not college
students demonstrating for the poor in America? Is it because
American college students have nothing to risk in South Africa but,
in the United States, they risk much if they have to divide the
economic pie with the poor?

Are American college students disciples of a materialism so
hypocritical, so self-centered, that they pretend to love the black
poor in Pretoria but would not give a nickel for the tears of the
black poor in Detroit or the white poor in Georgia?
Ask our politicians what they actually intend to do for the
millions of America's poor. You will see that love beyond family,
bed, and friends has very narrow limits, and that all the Bible
thumping in the world, all of the praying and chanting, all of the
handclapping, bowing and singing will not move a hair on a poor
man's head.

And then ask how much we are willing to deny ourselves to help
the poor. If we are willing to do very little, and if we are but a few
of the tens of millions of our class, then we will begin to see the
silhouette of the invisible Prince defending a society's economic
system by violating its religious ethics. Should we look even cl?ser,
we will see that we, the politically dominant working and nuddle
classes, eager to compel the upper classes to share econ?mic benefits
with us, are unwilling to share our economic benefits with the lowest
economic classes. Moreover, we may hold to our positions even
though the limitations of our natural resources indicate that t~e
working and middle classes in the West must make substantial
sacrifices if the lowest classes are to receive a sufficiency for their
human development.
What we do to our poor at home, we do to the poor abroad.
Developed nations have given only l to 2% of their gross national
products in assistance to underdeveloped nations. The .failure to
give more is traceable in great part to the refusal of middle-class
electorates to reduce their own level of consumption.
In the end, Machiavelli was right. We must choose between the
Rome of pagan antiquity and the Jerusalem of Judeo-Christian
ideals. And Machiavelli was right in his view that the great body of
mankind chooses neither Rome nor Jerusalem but instead vacillates
between them, attempts to compromise, weakem and· fails. Y ~t,
Machiavelli was fatally wrong about the nature of man. He saw m
man a selfish, treacherous animal, unchangeable by time or place,
whose history was worthy of study because it was bound to repeat
itself. Machiavelli therefore chose Rome.
Man, however, is not the weak victim of the rules of a Platonic
world of perfection. He is capable of living an ethical life while
doing so with the cunning of the serpent and the innocence of the
dove. 25 He is capable of living a life in which he has transcended
himself by reaching out in love to others. If he lives that life, the
life of the Judeo-Christian tradition, then he will have lived a life
in a dimension that has made him truly human. In the end, he will
know that by love he has touched the heart of the mystery of

creation.
If, however, man chooses a life in the abyss between Rome and
Jerusalem, then he will have taken, in M~chiavelli's words, "middle
ways that are very injurious". 26
Medicine yields an appropriate
analogy.

There is in neurology a curious, catastrophic condition sometimes
In 1the prose of medical
suffered by victims of stroke.
understatement, it is called "neglect of the left."27
The patient acts as if nothing is wrong, yet he reports that his
left side has disappeared. When shown his paralyzed left. arm, he
denies that it is his arm, asserts that it belongs to someone else, and
taking hold of it may fling it aside. He looks dull, apathetic,
inattentive. He is indifferent to failure, and reports a feeling of
"something missing". He neglects the left side of his body in
dressing and grooming. He fails to shave one side of his face or to
comb his hair on one side. He cannot put on eyeglasses or insert
dentures, for half of him does not exist. His perception of the unity
of his body, of the bodily parts to one another, has been ripped root
and branch from his mind. At night, while other patients sleep, he
lies in bed, repeatedly pressing his right side against a sideboard, all
in search of an unreachable sense of limitation, of wholeness, of
unity.
So it is with Machiavelli's conception of man. The half of him
that is animalistic, that is attracted by the invisible Prince, that part
remains; but the part that inclines itself to God, to "what ought to
be", is abandoned and atrophies. 28 A sense of subtle paralysis of
the will intrudes and, with it, a sense of a lack of wholeness, of
unity, a sense of the abyss. In pathology, the condition is called a
morbid inertia. In theology, it is called "an oppressive sorrow that
so weighs upon a man's mind that he wants not to exercise any
virtue". It.is the deadly sin of sloth, the sin of neglect by which we
separate ourselves from humanity. It is the sin by which we open
our door to the world only wide enough to take in the morning
paper.
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